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A COMMENT ON NO-FAULT INSURANCE
FOR ALL ACCIDENTS
RicHARD A. POSNER*
In most of their writings on no-fault insurance, Professor O'Connell
and his collaborator Professor Keeton have concentrated on the mechanics
of implementing various no-fault schemes. O'Connell's paper for this meeting
is in that vein. The question whether it would be desirable to abandon the
fault principle for accidents caused by defective products or improper medical
treatment is hardly discussed, and certainly not systematically. An affirmative
answer is presumed and the discussion moves on to the details of
implementation.
This seems to me an unfortunate emphasis, although perhaps one con-
genial to legal training and temperament. It is especially unfortunate when
one moves out of the automobile-accident context, where no-fault insurance
was first proposed, and into areas like products liability and malpractice,
which, as I shall try to show, raise distinct questions.
O'Connell's insensitivity (if I may speak bluntly) to the basic policy
issues involved in the debate over no-fault insurance is illustrated by the
way in which he moves from no liability to strict liability apparently without
awareness that these are significantly different principles. In the automobile-
accident context no-fault insurance has meant abrogating tort liability and
compelling the victim to buy accident insurance. O'Connell rejects such an
approach for non-automobile accidents as too costly and proposes instead
that manufacturers be permitted to elect to be strictly liable for accidents
caused by their products, but at a reduced schedule of damages. The analogy
is worker's compensation, not no-fault insurance. But I suspect that to
Professor O'Connell worker's compensation, no liability, and strict liability
are pretty much the same thing since they all do away with the fault prin-
ciple which for him is the principal goal of reform.
I shall attempt here, perhaps too briefly, to disentangle what seem to
me to be the major policy questions in the legal control of two types of
personal injury that O'Connell discusses - injury resulting from a malfunc-
tioning product and injury induced by medical treatment.
These are both areas where the fault principle is firmly embedded and
where, while it would be easy to understand what would be meant by a pro-
posal to substitute no liability, the very meaning of "strict liability" is a
puzzle. Although we speak of strict liability for product accidents, the term
is a misnomer. Liability is limited to defective products and the determination
whether a product is defective resembles the usual negligence determination.
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To be sure, the manufacturer's liability includes defective components sup-
plied by other manufacturers in circumstances where his failure to discover
the defect cannot be judged blameworthy; but this aspect of strict liability
has its counterpart in respondeat superior in the ordinary negligence context.
What would it mean to say that a manufacturer should be strictly liable
for the consequences of accidents resulting from the use of his nondefective
product? If A hits B with a baseball bat, would the manufacturer of the
bat be liable for B's injury? Would he be liable if A (non-negligently)
dropped the bat on his own toe? Suppose a manufacturer of tires guaranteed
that his tires would not blow out in normal use for 20,000 miles: would he,
under O'Connell's proposal, be liable for an accident that occurred after
100,000 miles of normal use, or after 15,000 miles of driving at high speeds
over ungraded roads? I assume the answer in all of these cases is 'no'. But
that makes me wonder what exactly Professor O'Connell is proposing. A
similar puzzle would arise with respect to a proposal to impose strict liability
for medical mishaps. Suppose the proper treatment for some ailment involves
a drug that has harmful side effects. Is the physician liable for those side
effects? That seems an absurd result. But if he is not liable I do not see
what meaning can be assigned the notion of strict liability for injuries arising
from medical treatment.
Passing these difficulties, I come to what to me are the fundamental
questions that must be answered in designing a system of legal control of
personal injuries: what are the likely effects on the safety, and the prices,
of products and of medical treatment if manufacturers and health-care pro-
viders are made strictly liable for injuries resulting from product use or
medical care? At first glance it might appear obvious that enlarging the
liability of a seller will induce him to increase the safety of his product but
there are two reasons for doubting that this is necessarily true. First, if the
alternative to strict liability is some form of negligence liability and if
negligence, roughly speaking, means failure to take cost-justified precautions,
why should the imposition of strict liability induce the seller to take addi-
tional precautions? To avoid being adjudged negligent, he will already be
taking those precautions that cost less than the savings in reduced accident
liability. Strict liability will not induce him to take additional precautions -
precautions that are by definition not cost-justified to him - since if the
savings in reduced liability are smaller than the costs of averting that
liability, he is better off accepting the increased liability and forgoing the
additional precautions. This assumes, to be sure, that sellers of products and
of medical services are rational'calculators of their self-interest. I find the
assumption quite plausible, as does O'Connell. Certainly the usual arguments
made against treating the average automobile driver as nicely calculating
the costs and benefits of alternative levels of safety lose much of their force
when applied to manufacturers, hospitals, and physicians.
Second, the products and medical-treatment contexts differ from the
automobile-accident context in that there is a pre-existing seller-buyer re-
lationship between injurer and victim. The seller of a potentially dangerous
product can be viewed as selling a combination of two products, one of
which has a negative value to the consumer. There is the product itself, but
tied to it is the danger of a mishap resulting from its use. The maximum price
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that the consumer will pay for the product is the sum of the values of these
two goods (one a bad). Clearly, the safer the product, other things being
equal, the higher the price for the package that the seller can command.
This suggests that the optimum level of product safety will be supplied
without any intervention by the legal system, save perhaps to prevent mis-
leading claims relating to product safety. Suppose that the use value of a
widget is $1 and the expected accident cost of using the product is one cent.'
Then the most the consumer will pay for a widget is 99 cents. Suppose that
the sort of accident to which widgets are prone occurs and that the consumer
sustains an accident that costs him $10,000. Has he cause to complain to
the widget producer? He does not. He was compensated for bearing the risk
of an accident by being permitted to purchase widgets for 99 cents instead of
$1. His situation is the same as that of the person who goes to a baseball
game and thereby assumes the risk of being beaned. Presumably if there were
no such risk the price of a baseball ticket would be (infinitesimally) higher.
Now suppose that widget producers are made strictly liable for any
accidents to consumers using their product. In effect, the widget producer is
being forced to sell a new package, consisting of (1) the use value of a
widget, (2) the expected accident cost, and (3) an insurance policy against
that accident. The value of the new package is $1. But the cost to the con-
sumer has not changed. The higher price simply buys an insurance policy
that he would otherwise have had to pay for out of his own pocket. The
output of widgets will not be changed, nor will the safety incentives of the
widget industry be altered.
This analysis suggests that the choice of the rule of liability is less im-
portant in a sales context (including the sale of medical care) than in ac-
cidents between persons not in a sales relationship. But it may not be wholly
unimportant. There is a rather technical objection to strict liability in the
sales context, which I have discussed elsewhere and will not try to go into
here; it has to do with differential attitudes toward risk.2 There is also an
objection to no liability. In order for consumers to be able to choose that
mixture of use value and danger that maximizes their satisfactions, they have
to know something about the relative dangers of competing products. But
because product accidents are (happily) extraordinarily infrequent, most
consumers have only the vaguest idea of the relative dangers. The producer
who has a safer product therefore cannot rely on the consumer to discover
its greater safety on his own. The usual method by which producers draw
attention to nonobvious improvements in their products is by advertising.
But the producer who advertises a safer product runs the risk of alerting
1The expected accident cost is the product of the likelihood of an accident's
occurring and the cost of an accident if it does occur. A consumer having an aversion
to risk would demand greater compensation for bearing this risk than the expected
accident cost, and a risk-preferring consumer would be willing to accept less. Thus
the example in text assumes a risk-neutral consumer.
2 Strict liability, assuming that disclaimers of liability are prohibited, in effect forces
the producer to insure the consumer against an accident. A risk preferrer, however,
prefers the risk of an accident to the certainty of insurance and he is made worse off
by a compusory insurance scheme. See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1972) at 90-91.
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the consumer to a danger of which he may have been unaware; after all,
safer implies dangerous. Safety advertising is thus a double-edged sword and
this may limit not only the amount of such advertising but the incentive to
market safer products. Strict liability eliminates this problem by making the
consumer's knowledge of product safety irrelevant. Though the consumer
has absolutely no knowledge of product danger, strict liability will induce
the producer to compare the costs and benefits of possible safety improve-
ments and to introduce those that are cost-justified - those, that is, that
will reduce his net liability costs.
A similar problem exists in the medical area, compounded by the great
uncertainties that surround many forms of medical treatment and the pro-
hibition against advertising by physicians. While in theory one could dispense
with malpractice liability and permit doctors and patients in effect to
negotiate the desired standard of care, the incompleteness of the customer's
knowledge and the absence of effective channels by which competing health-
care providers might communicate the requisite information to the customer
may argue for imposing liability for failure to follow standard methods of
treatment.
O'Connell would evidently prefer no liability in both the products and
medical-care contexts if society would accept the price tag for compulsory
accident insurance covering the two areas. But if the foregoing analysis is
correct no liability would reduce the incentives to take precautions and would
increase the social loss from defective products and improper medical treat-
ment. His proposal for permitting injurers in these areas to limit their liability
to what he calls 'out-of-pocket' expenses works in the same direction. He
seems to think that if strict liability would make an injurer liable in twice
as many cases as would negligence liability, but the extent of his liability in
each case was halved, nothing would have changed but the distribution of
compensation among accident victims. This is incorrect. As suggested earlier,
imposing strict liability may not result in any reduction in the total number
of accidents. But halving the cost of every accident for which the injurer
would be liable under a negligence system will cause him to revise downward
the benefits to him of preventing each accident, and with the benefits of pre-
cautions now lower, he will take fewer precautions and there will be more
accidents.
Let me try to summarize my reactions to O'Connells proposal. It is
possible that abrogating tort liability for defective products and medical
malpractice would not affect the safety of products or of health care. Then
the only question would be whether, having eliminated a form of insurance
against these types of hazard, society should force potential victims to buy
insurance policies. But it is also possible, and I would venture to guess likely,
that abrogating tort liability in these areas would result in an increase, above
efficient levels, in the number of product and medical mishaps. I would con-
sider this a most unfortunate by-product of our zeal to force people to insure
themselves against accidents. Finally, I have difficulty understanding what
precisely O'Connell means when he proposes to substitute 'strict liability'
for our present system of liability for defective products and for medical
malpractice - short of a complete guarantee against injury consequent upon
the use of a product or the receipt of medical treatment.
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